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NOTE
Pool Houses and Public Policy: The
Uncollectability of Contractual Attorney
Fees in Missouri
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d 165
(Mo. 2021) (en banc)
Evan Miller*

I. INTRODUCTION
Homeowners associations (“HOAs”) are a foundational piece of life
in the United States for people of all socioeconomic backgrounds.1 These
planned communities provide stable living arrangements that many
homeowners desire,2 and protect buyers’ expectations of a neighborhood’s
character.3 Despite the ostensibly beneficial goals of HOAs, they have
generated substantial controversy.4 Columbia, Missouri, was the backdrop

*

B.A., Southern Utah University, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2023. Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. Professor
Wilson Freyermuth provided valuable insight into the development of this note's form
and substance. I appreciate his willingness to mentor and guide me. I am grateful to
the staff of the Missouri Law Review who helped me publish this note. Finally, I am
grateful to my wife, Jessica, and my son, Jansen, who supported me and sacrificed
time with me so I could write this note.
1
See generally Rachel Furman, Collecting Unpaid Assessments: The
Homeowner Association's Dilemma When Foreclosure Is No Longer A Viable Option,
19 J.L. & POL'Y 751, 752 (2011).
2
Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and
Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 663, 671 (2000).
3
Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character:
Homeowners Associations and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV.
839, 847 (2013).
4
See generally Janet M. Bollinger, Homeowners' Associations and the Use of
Property Planning Tools: When Does the Right to Exclude Go Too Far?, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 269, 270–71 (2008) (describing the constitutional controversies of Ave Marie, a
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of a garden-variety HOA dispute between Ajay Aggarwal and Megha
Garg (“the Homeowners”) and the Arrowhead Lake Estates Homeowners
Association (“Arrowhead”).5 The Homeowners submitted a plan for
several outdoor improvements but failed to include a small shed that would
cover pool equipment.6 After a trial judge’s denial of a substantial sum of
attorney fees, the parties litigated whether the HOA should receive its
attorney fees.7 What originally seemed like a petty dispute over a small
shack became a four-year march through all three levels of Missouri’s
judicial system to arrive at a result that may frustrate future litigants and
harm homeowners.8
Part II of this Note examines the details and procedural posture that
gave rise to this dispute. Part III provides context to governance and
dispute resolution in HOAs and the role courts play in interpreting
contracts that award attorney fees. Part IV details the majority’s reasoning
for overriding the lower court’s award of attorney fees in the instant case
and focuses on how the majority and the dissenting opinions approached
interpretation of the declaration. Part V addresses the extent to which the
majority’s approach contrasts with that taken by the weight of case
authority and discusses the broader policy implications of the majority’s
opinion on HOA governance and attorney fee provisions.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Homeowners own property in Arrowhead Lake Estates, 9 which
is subject to the “Declaration of Covenants, Easements, and Restrictions
of Arrowhead Lake Estates Subdivision” (“the Declaration”).10 Among
other things, the Declaration has an attorney-fee clause for any disputes
that arise under the Declaration.11 Arrowhead enforces the Declaration

planned Roman Catholic stronghold which pledged to outlaw pornography, and
Celebration, owned by Disney, which may have curtailed political speech).
5
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d 165,
166 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
6
Substitute Brief of Respondents Ajay Aggarwal and Megha Garg, Aggarwal,
624 S.W.3d 165 (No. SC98772), 2021 WL 1086434, at *5.
7
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 168. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated that their
preference for the phrase “attorney fees” is no apostrophe. Id. at 166 n.1.
8
See infra notes 166–77.
9
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 166.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 168.
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through a committee,12 and requires homeowners to submit plans for lot
improvements to a separate committee before executing them.13 As
expected, when the Homeowners wanted to improve the property, they
submitted a plan with several outdoor improvements to the proper
committee for approval.14 The plans the committee received did not
contain a shed for pool equipment.15 The committee approved the
Homeowners’ plans within twenty-four hours,16 but warned the
Homeowners that if they made any other improvements to the original
submission, the committee would need to approve the changes before any
construction could begin.17 Shortly thereafter, the Homeowners began
building the shed,.18
In August 2017, Arrowhead learned of the shed and told the
Homeowners that the committee had not approved it and the Homeowners
must remove it.19 After ten days, the Homeowners had not complied,20
prompting a letter from Arrowhead’s attorney requesting that the
Homeowners comply with HOA policy.21 The Homeowners did not
comply with the letter.22 Arrowhead filed a petition in the circuit court of
Boone County for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the construction
of the structure, a permanent injunction, and for an award of their attorney
fees on September 8, 2017.23

Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief, Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d 165 (No.
SC98772), 2021 WL 1086431, at *3.
13
Substitute Brief of Respondents Ajay Aggarwal and Megha Garg, supra note
6.
14
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 166 (naming improvements like decking, a hot tub,
a swimming pool, a fence, and a fire pit).
15
Substitute Brief of Respondents Ajay Aggarwal and Megha Garg, supra note
6.
16
Id.
17
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 166. In Arrowhead’s brief to the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Western District, Arrowhead Lake stated the provisions of the declaration
they accused homeowners of violating. Section 9e of the Declaration stated that
nothing “[shall] be constructed unless it has been first approved, in writing, by the
Architectural Control Committee.” Appellant’s Substitute Brief, Aggarwal, 624
S.W.3d 165 (No. SC98772), 2021 WL 1086428, at *8.
18
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 166.
19
Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief, supra note 12, at *9–10.
20
Id. at *10.
21
Id. (stating that the cease-and-desist letter came from Arrowhead’s attorney).
22
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 167.
23
Id.; CASENET, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/caseNoSearch.do (last visited
Nov. 5, 2021) (search case number “17BA-CV03335” to show temporary restraining
order issued) [hereinafter Aggarwal TRO].
12

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 10

618

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

On October 23, 2017, the court granted Arrowhead Lake’s temporary
restraining order.24 Following an eight-day bench trial spanning several
months, the circuit court awarded permanent injunctive relief to
Arrowhead.25 At the close of the trial, the circuit court ordered both sides
to pay their own attorney fees.26 Both parties filed motions for
amendment, clarification, and reconsideration.27 The final judgement bore
a series of small “x”s across the attorney fee provision.28 Arrowhead Lake
appealed the refusal of an attorney fee award to the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Western District.29
A three-judge panel treated the Declaration as a contract, so its
meaning was treated as a question of law requiring a de novo review.30
The court of appeals held that the trial court was required to award attorney
fees and could only exercise its discretion regarding the amount of attorney
fees.31 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed the circuit court and
remanded the case for determination the appropriate amount of attorney
fees as required by the plain reading of the contract.32
On December 29, 2020, the Supreme Court of Missouri granted
transfer.33 Without mentioning the decision from the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the circuit court’s decision not to award

24

Aggarwal TRO, supra note 23.
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 167; Aggarwal TRO, supra note 23.
26
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 167.
27
Aggarwal TRO, supra note 23.
28
Id.; Aggarwal TRO, supra note 23. This may seem like a confusing
chronology of events, but the June 19, 2019, docket contains two entries form Judge
Shaw, one awarding attorney fees and one refusing to award attorney fees. Neither
Missouri Casenet nor any related documents expand on why Judge Shaw released two
conflicting orders on the same day.
29
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, No. WD 83019,
2020 WL 5160693, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2020).
30
Id. at 2.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Id.
33
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d 165,
166 n.2 (Mo. 2021) (en banc) (stating the basis for the Missouri Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction in Article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides, in relevant
part, “Cases…may be transferred to the supreme court by order of the majority of the
judges of the participating district of the court of appeals, after opinion, or by order of
the supreme court before or after opinion because of the general interest or importance
of a question involved in the case, or for the purpose of reexamining the existing law,
or pursuant to supreme court rule.” MO. CONST. art. V, § 10. The Supreme Court acts
as a court of original appellate jurisdiction for cases with questions of general
importance. State v. Bradshaw, 593 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
25
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attorney fees to Arrowhead.34 The provision in the Declaration stating “the
prevailing party shall be entitled to receive an aware [sic] of attorney's fees
and court costs as deemed appropriate by a court of competent
jurisdiction” allowed the circuit court to exercise its discretion in not
awarding any attorney fees.35

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The first half of this Part surveys the ecosystem of HOAs, including
their mechanisms for enforcing covenants and financing their services.
The second half examines how courts interpret attorney fee provisions in
contracts.

A. Framing the Debate: Homeowners’ Associations in the United
States
Property owners living in common interest communities (“CICs”)
governed by HOAs purchase their property subject to covenants governing
the use of the land within the HOA’s boundaries.36 Elected boards are
required to enforce the declarations governing CICs. 37 These declarations
can be very restrictive.38 While HOA stories range from amusing to
disturbing, membership in an HOA is quickly becoming the norm in
American life.39 Finding a home outside of a CIC has become increasingly
difficult.40 Nevertheless, property owners do not always agree with the

34

Id. at 171.
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 168 (emphasis added).
36
Whispering Valley Lakes Imp. Ass'n v. Franklin Cty. Mercantile Bank, 879
S.W.2d 572, 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (describing covenants that “run” with the land
to bind all future possessors of the property).
37
Lori A. Roberts, Topping Palm Trees in the Name of CC&R Enforcement: A
Proposal to Temper CC&R Enforcement with Common Sense, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 413,
421 (2009).
38
Franzese, supra note 2, at 664 (telling the story of an HOA that attempted to
force a family to remove a treehouse they built while the homeowners’ son was
fighting cancer).
39
Record Number of Homeowners live in HOA Communities, NAT’L ASS’N OF
REALTORS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://magazine.realtor/daily-news/2020/09/23/recordnumber-of-homeowners-live-in-hoa-communities [https://perma.cc/V9FQ-2229].
40
Rebecca Crooker, Hey, Neighbor: Homeowners' Associations, Super-Priority
Liens, and the Need for Balanced Rights in Nevada, 19 NEV. L.J. 313, 316–17 (2018)
(municipalities often require developers to create an HOA before the developer
receives a permit to buld the subdivision).
35
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enforcement of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”)41
and these disagreements frequently lead to litigation.42 To meet the
expectations of homeowners and quash CC&R violations, declarations
typically provide two distinct functions: a governance and enforcement
structure and an ability to finance the association.43
The HOA must prudently consider many priorities when budgeting
resources for the coming year to avoid shortfalls.44 Homeowners living in
a CIC expect that the HOA will maintain common areas and fulfill other
functions as stated in the CC&Rs.45 Additionally, economically-stressed
municipalities assign duties such as road care and utilities, like sewer and
trash disposal, to HOAs.46 The HOA raises funds to discharge these duties
by levying assessments against each property owner.47 Assessments are a
function of the HOA’s expenses spread evenly across its members and are
typically the only form of income for the HOA.48 HOAs are often
financially vulnerable because they only collect the minimum amount of
assessments to fund the HOA regime.49 Thus, when property owners do
not pay their assessments, the HOA may not have adequate operating
funds and may therefore not offer expected amenities.50
Declarations also often limit property use within a CIC, creating
contention between the HOA and individual homeowners.51 Courts have

41

Pollack, supra note 3, at 843–44.
Id.
43
Roberts, supra note 37, at 415; Pollack, supra note 3, at 842–43; Brandt H.
Stitzer, HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400
(2013).
44
James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1150 (1998) (listing “utilities water,
landscaping and grounds maintenance, exterior repairs, recreational expenses, payroll,
management, legal and accounting fees, insurance, telephone, communication and
newsletters, miscellaneous contingency fees, and contributions to reserves for
extraordinary expenses” as considerations for yearly budgeting).
45
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 6.5, cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2000).
46
Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common
Interest Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1112–13 (2007).
47
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 6.5(1)(a)(2).
48
Furman, supra note 1, at 754–55.
49
Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, supra note 44 at 1142.
50
Furman, supra note 1, at 755; Roberts, supra note 37, at 415.
51
Laura T. Rahe, The Right of Exclude: Preserving the Autonomy of the
Homeowners' Association, 34 URB. LAW. 521, 523 (2002); see, e.g., Franzese &
Siegel, supra note 46 (citing reports of contention between the HOA board its
constituent members).
42
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interpreted declarations as contracts and require board members to act
reasonably in enforcing CC&Rs. 52 As HOAs resolve these disputes, courts
have traditionally applied the “business judgment rule,” native to
reviewing corporate governance decisions, to HOA board actions.53 Thus,
so long as board members exercise honest judgment and do not act out of
self-interest, their decisions are insulated from judicial second-guessing.54
For example, when an architectural committee denies an improvement to
a lot, the disappointed lot owner seeking to overturn the decision must
prove that the board acted with bad faith.55 While this standard may seem
like “common sense,”56 board members are not always prepared to govern
their neighbors benevolently.57 In one infamous case, an HOA informed
a boy, sick with leukemia, that the tree house he built with his father as a
symbol of hope violated the CC&Rs.58 The HOA retreated from its
position only after intense public backlash.59
While telling a boy with a serious illness that his treehouse is
diminishing property values might seem unfathomable, HOAs may feel
compelled to enforce the restrictions absolutely because lax enforcement
may lead to a judicial determination that the HOA abandoned the
covenants and cannot enforce them.60 Therefore, to preserve the
objectives of the declaration and their enforcement authority, HOAs may
litigate solely on principle.61 Because litigating on principle may not
return large settlements, courts have stated HOAs should receive attorney
fee awards in their efforts to enforce the covenants, pursuant to relevant
fee-shifting provisions in the CC&Rs.62
Homeowners disappointed with their HOA’s governance may be
limited to running for a position on the board of directors or changing the

52

Roberts, supra note 37, at 422.
Franzese, supra note 2, at 676.
54
Id. at 677; see also Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553
N.E.2d 1317, 1322 (N.Y. 1990).
55
Pollack, supra note 3, at 875.
56
Franzese, supra note 2, at 677.
57
James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 64 (1989).
58
Franzese, supra note 2, at 664.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Gabriel v. Cazier, 938 P.2d 1209, 1212 (1997) (Schroeder, J.,
concurring).
61
Arches Condo. Ass'n v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 122, 135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
62
Id.
53
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declaration through the amendment process.63 Amending the CC&Rs is
not easy and usually requires a supermajority of lot owners to vote in favor
of the amendment.64 Some friction between HOAs and homeowners
occurs because the CC&Rs are drafted by the developer, whose interests
are not always congruent with those of homeowners.65 Commentators
accuse developers of “dead hand control” of the HOA that mires residents
in “draconian” restrictions that are “remarkably resistant” to any
amendment.66 In addition, procedural roadblocks can stifle homeowners’
ability to adapt declarations to changing circumstances in CICs. 67
CC&Rs providing for attorney fee awards allow the HOA to recoup
its expenses sustained to enforce the covenants.68 Without an award of
attorney fees to the prevailing HOA, the homeowners who are not
violating the CC&Rs must pay the attorney fees generated by the
contumacious, disruptive homeowner.69 Some CC&Rs style the shifting
of fees from the prevailing party to the losing party as a “special
assessment” against the offending lot owner, further demonstrating the
reliance of HOAs on homeowner-paid assessments as the sole source of
funding.70 Further, one court observed that “chaos” would ensue if all
homeowners had to pay tens of thousands of dollars in attorney fees to
collect delinquent balances of less than $1000.71 Several state legislatures
have codified the mandate for attorney fees in actions to uphold CC&Rs,
recognizing the importance of attorney fee awards to the viability of
CICs.72
63

Bollinger, supra note 4, at 272; Franzese & Siegel, supra note 46, at 1112.
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 46, at 1114.
65
Id. at 1113.
66
Id. at 1114.
67
Pollack, supra note 3, at 865–66 (developers can retain three votes for each
unsold lot, appoint the initial board members, and require a supermajority to change
anything in the declaration).
68
Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1196 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., Northwoods Condo. Owners' Assn. v. Arnold, 770 N.E.2d 627, 632
(Ohio 2002).
71
Arches Condo. Ass'n v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 122, 135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015)
(holding that an attorney fee award of more than $26,000 to collect a balance of
$939.83 was justified under the declaration and statutes governing HOAs).
72
See, e.g., 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3315(f) (2016); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5975 (West
2014) (interpreted in Salehi v. Surfside III Condo. Owners' Assn., 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d
886, 889 (2011), stating that “The words ‘shall be [awarded]’ reflect a legislative
intent that [the prevailing party] receive attorney fees as a matter of right”); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-123 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.719 (2007) (the prevailing
64
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B. Contractual Attorney Fees: From Contract to Litigation to Appeal
The “American Rule,” which provides that each side pay its own
attorney fees, derives from Arcambel v. Wiseman, a case about a
privateered boat.73 The prevailing attorney asked the judge for his attorney
fees as “damages.”74 The court denied his request and unequivocally
stated, “The general practice of the United States is in opposition to
[attorney fee awards to the prevailing party]; and… it is entitled to the
respect of the court.”75 The opinion was brief, but American jurisprudence
has relied upon the rule in Arcambel since 1797 as courts have decided
whether to award attorney fees to prevailing parties.76 In contrast, the
“English Rule” provides that the losing litigant pay a more significant
share of the litigation expenses, including attorney fees.77 While the
American Rule stands as the current default rule for attorney fees in
Missouri,78 parties to a dispute can agree to allocate liability for attorney

party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees therein and in any appeal
therefrom) (emphasis added); Goodsell v. Eagle-Air Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, 383
P.3d 365, 372 (Or. 2016) (“Thus it is a compulsory fee statute, (not a discretionary
one)”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55.1-1915 (2019) (“the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees, costs expended in the matter.”); Lambert v. Sea Oats
Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 798 S.E.2d 177, 183 (Va. 2017) (“Second, [shall be entitled] makes
an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party mandatory, in contrast
to other statutes making such an award discretionary”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
559.206(b) (2001) (Michigan statute authorizing recovery of attorney fees: “In a
proceeding arising because of an alleged default by a co-owner, the association of coowners or the co-owner, if successful, shall recover the costs of the proceeding and
reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court, to the extent the condominium
documents expressly so provide”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 856
(1986).
73
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1797). The boat at issue was allegedly
outfitted by private citizens to capture enemy boats on the high seas. Aaron
Bartholomew & Sharon Yamen, The American Rule: The Genesis and Policy of the
Enduring Legacy on Attorney Fee Awards, 30- OCT UTAH B.J., SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER
2017, at 15.
74
Bartholomew & Yamen, supra note 73, at 16.
75
Arcambel, 3 U.S. 306 at 306.
76
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 230 (1872) (calling the rule declared in
Arcambel v. Wiseman settled law almost 100 years later).
77
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1601–14 (1993) (describing that
the alleged “winner takes all” system in England is not as clear as opponents of the
American Rule sometimes describe the English Rule).
78
See generally Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 431
(Mo. 2013) (en banc); Nelson v. Hotchkiss, 601 S.W.2d 14, 21 (Mo. 1980) (en banc);
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fees differently.79 Trial courts often work to define the extent of
contractual attorney fee provisions through settled contract interpretation
principles.80 Trial courts in Missouri are allowed vast deference in their
determination of the amount of attorney fee awards.81 However, where
the parties contest the court’s legal determination that the contract
provides for an award of attorney fees as a matter of right, the appellate
must apply a de novo standard of review .82

1. Basis for the Award: Trial Court Discretion and Appellate Review
Attorney fees can become quite large, especially in protracted
litigation.83 In addition to asking for relief related to substantive issues,
losing parties sometimes appeal the trial court’s decision to award attorney
fees and the amount of the attorney fees.84 In Missouri, trial courts are
considered experts on the amount of reasonable attorney fees and are
allowed to use their discretion in determining them.85 An appellate court
will only overturn a trial court’s award of attorney fees if the trial court
has abused its discretion.86 The reviewing court may only find an abuse
of discretion where “the award is so ‘clearly against the logic of the
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense
of justice,’”87 or where the award indicates a “lack of proper judicial
consideration.”88 The burden is on the complaining party to prove that the
trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of the attorney fee

Arnold v. Edelman, 392 S.W.2d 231, 239 (Mo. 1965); St. Louis R. Co. v. S. Ry. Co.,
138 Mo. 591, 39 S.W. 471, 472 (1897).
79
Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson Cty., 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc).
80
Trimble v. Pracna, 167 S.W.3d 706, 714–15 (Mo. 2005) (en banc);
WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383, 385–86 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2015).
81
WingHaven, 457 S.W.3d at 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that the trial
court did not need to explain its reasoning for not awarding attorney fees).
82
Ely v. Alter, 561 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
83
Bangerter v. Hat Island Cmty. Ass'n, 472 P.3d 998, 1013, review granted in
part sub nom, Surowiecki v. Hat Island Cmty. Ass'n, 479 P.3d 1162 (2021) (awarding
attorney fee of $240,923.65).
84
See, e.g., Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Mo.
2013) (en banc).
85
Nelson v. Hotchkiss, 601 S.W.2d 14, 21 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
86
Id.
87
Hills v. Greenfield Vill. Homes Ass'n, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997).
88
Nelson, 601 S.W.2d at 21.
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award.89 Trial courts in Missouri are not required to provide any reasoning
to support their award of attorney fees.90 In Winghaven Residential
Owners Association, Inc. v. Bridges, the court recognized that proving the
court abused its discretion without the court giving a rationale for its
decision is an onerous burden to carry.91 The hardship in establishing
abuse of discretion is further exacerbated by Supreme Court Rule 73.01(c),
which states that there is an automatic presumption of correctness for
decisions that have no specific findings of fact.92 In Dewalt v. Davidson
Service/Air, Inc., the court even confessed that it could not determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion without findings of fact or
law.93
Different rules govern where the issue becomes one solely of contract
interpretation.94 The trial court’s legal conclusions do not bind the
Supreme Court of Missouri on appeal.95 Further, the Court owes no
deference to the trial court when the sole issue on appeal is the
“construction of documents based on the language they employ.”96 A trial
court’s failure to award attorney fees when required by contract is
erroneous.97 While trial court discretion applies in determining the amount
and reasonableness of an award of attorney fees,98 the court has no

89

Id.
Compare Nelson, 601 S.W.2d at 21 with Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass'n,
Inc., 798 S.E.2d 177, 182 (Va. 2017) (stating that a statute or precedence may
circumscribe the range of correct decisions available to a judge in exercising their
discretion).
91
See WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383,
386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
92
MO. SUP. CT. R. 73.01(c).
93
DeWalt v. Davison Serv./Air, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 491, 507–08 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
94
Anchor Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Mercantile Bank, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 23, 32 (Mo.
1991) (en banc); see also Brown v. Brown-Thill, 437 S.W.3d 344, 348 (Mo. Ct. App.
2014) (stating that, while denials of attorney fees are usually reviewed for abuse of
discretion, review of contract provisions is de novo, and the Court must award attorney
fees provided for in a contract).
95
Anchor Ctr., 803 S.W.3d at 32.
96
Obermeyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., 140 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. 2004) (en banc),
as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 24, 2004).
97
Ely v. Alter, 561 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); Frontenac Bank v. GB
Invests., LLC, 528 S.W.3d 381, 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); Magna Bank of Madison
Cty. v. W.P. Foods, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 157, 162–63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Hills v.
Greenfield Vill. Homes Ass'n, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
98
WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383, 385–
86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“However, the determination of the amount of attorneys' fees
90
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discretion where the contract provides attorney fee awards as a matter of
right.99 Missouri appellate courts therefore review the lower court’s
interpretation of a contract de novo.100 In Trimble v. Pracna, the Supreme
Court of Missouri corrected a trial court’s interpretation of a contractual
attorney fee provision.101 The Supreme Court interpreted the contract de
novo, found it was ambiguous, and adjusted the results accordingly.102
While the amount of attorney fees remained in the province of the trial
court, the Supreme Court instructed the trial court to award attorney fees
in a manner consistent with the correct interpretation of the disputed
contract.103

2. Contract Interpretation: How are Attorney Fee Awards Construed?
When interpreting a contract, a Missouri trial court’s primary focus
is on giving effect to the intentions of the parties.104 The court must give
words their plain meanings,105 and when a contract has conflicting
provisions and is ambiguous, the court should strive to give meaning to all
words in the contract.106 In applying these rules, courts should not
interpret any word in a manner that renders other terms meaningless.107 In
the instant case, the court struggled with the construction of the provision
“the prevailing party shall be entitled to [an award] of attorney's fees and
court costs as deemed appropriate by a court of competent jurisdiction.”108

is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”) (emphasis added)); See also DeWalt,
398 S.W.3d at 506.
99
Trimble v. Pracna, 167 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
100
Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007).
101
Trimble, 167 S.W.3d at 715.
102
Id. at 714–15.
103
Id. at 715.
104
DeBaliviere Place Ass'n v. Veal, 337 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Mo. 2011) (en banc);
see also John R. Schleppenbach, Winning the Battle but Losing the War: Towards A
More Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee Shifting in the Contractual
Context, 12 FLA. A & M U.L. REV. 185, 211 (2017) (summarizing approach in other
jurisdictions).
105
Trs. of Clayton Terrace Subdivision v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, 585 S.W.3d
269, 280 (Mo.) (en banc), reh’g denied (Nov. 19, 2019).
106
See Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 140–41 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
107
Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo.
2003) (en banc).
108
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d
165, 168, 170 (Mo. 2021) (en banc). (emphasis added).
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Common law from other states illustrate how other courts have interpreted
declarations similar to Arrowhead’s.
In Parker Estates Homeowners Association v. Pattison, the
homeowners failed to pay assessments, alleging a procedural defect in the
election of board members.109 The HOA successfully pursued an action
against them for the unpaid assessments.110 The declaration stated that
“the prevailing party shall be entitled to [attorney fees] as the court may
adjudge reasonable…at trial…”111 On appeal, the Washington Court of
Appeals held that the prevailing HOA deserved attorney fees and
remanded the case to the trial court to determine the award amount.112
In Highfield Beach at Lake Michigan v. Sanderson, a Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award of attorney fees.113 In Michigan,
declarations are governed by statute.114 The statute included the provision,
“…if successful, [he/she] shall recover the costs of the proceeding and
reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court, to the extent the
condominium documents expressly so provide.”115
The relevant
condominium documents provided “…if successful, shall [he/she] recover
the costs of the proceeding and reasonable attorney fees…as determined
by the Court.”116 The court stated that this was an “indemnity” clause, and
the trial court was correct in awarding attorney fees.117
In summary, these cases and others are instructive because they
illustrate how other state courts have interpreted attorney fee-shifting
clauses. In Parker Estates, the court stated that an “unambiguous” reading
of the declaration yielded an outcome that awarded attorney fees to the
prevailing party.118 The decision in Highfield Beach noted the critical role
attorney fee clauses play in HOA litigation,119 and that the attorney fee
clause was “nondiscretionary” for the trial judge.120 Additionally, in

109
Parker Ests. Homeowners Ass'n v. Pattison, 391 P.3d 481, 485 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2016).
110
Id. at 490.
111
Id. at 489–90.
112
Id. at 490.
113
954 N.W.2d 231, 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
114
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 559.206 (2022).
115
Id. § 559.206(b).
116
Highfield Beach at Lake Michigan v. Sanderson, 954 N.W.2d 231, 249 (Mich
Ct. App. 2020).
117
Id. at 252.
118
Id. at 251.
119
Id. at 252.
120
Id. at 252 (Gadola, P.J., concurring).
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Delaware,121 Florida,122 Idaho,123 New York,124 and the District of
Columbia,125 courts awarded attorney fees in situations where the
governing declaration phrased its award provision similarly to “the
prevailing party shall be entitled to [an award] of attorney's fees” with
different forms of qualifying language.126 The reviewing court found in
each case that the prevailing party is entitled to its attorney fees
notwithstanding the qualifying language.127

IV. INSTANT DECISION
This Part considers the majority’s construction of the Declaration and
rationale for upholding the circuit court’s decision to deny attorney fees to
Arrowhead. It also gives the dissenting opinion’s argument in favor of
construing the declaration to award attorney fees to Arrowhead.

A. Majority Opinion
The majority began by rehearsing the default rules in Missouri for
attorney fee awards and contract interpretation.128 Arrowhead’s first claim
for attorney’s fees arose under Section 18(d) of the Declaration, which
stated that “if the Claim is litigated in whole or in part, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to receive an aware [sic] of attorney's fees and court costs
121

Rsrvs. Mgmt., LLC v. Am. Acquisition Prop. I, LLC, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del.
2014) (“[I]n the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment shall include . . .
reasonable attorneys' fees to be fixed by the Court. . . . [T]he Declaration effectively
precluded the application of the American rule.”).
122
Tison v. Clairmont Condo. F Ass'n, Inc., 288 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2019) (“The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover…reasonable attorney's
fees as may be determined by the court”).
123
Fletcher v. Lone Mountain Rd. Ass'n, 452 P.3d 802, 805 (Idaho 2019) (“Any
Owner . . . shall have the right to enforce . . . all restrictions . . . and . . . shall be entitled
to . . . reasonable attorneys' fees as are ordered by the Court.”).
124
Bd. of Managers v. Lamontanero, 579 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560–61 (1991), aff'd,
616 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[T]he prevailing party shall be entitled
to…reasonable attorneys' fees as may be determined by the Court.”).
125
Ochs v. L'Enfant Tr., 504 A.2d 1110, 1119 (D.C. 1986) (“[T]he prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover . . . reasonable attorney's fees as may be determined
by the court.”).
126
Cf. Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d
165, 168 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
127
Compare id. at 169 (trial court had discretion in awarding attorney fees), with
Highfield Beach at Lake Mich. v. Sanderson, 954 N.W.2d 231, 253 (Mich. Ct. App.
2020) (Gadola, J., concurring) (the declaration did not give the trial court discretion).
128
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 167.
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as deemed appropriate by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 129 The
majority proceeded to engage in contract interpretation and defined
“entitled” as qualifying Arrowhead to receive an award of attorney fees.130
The majority gave the definition for “entitle,”131 but did not discuss how
“shall” and “entitled” should be read together.132 The majority recounted
a group of cases with similar factual circumstances to the instant case.133
In each of the cases, “shall” entitled the prevailing parties to receive an
attorney fee award.134 However, the language “as deemed appropriate” in
the present Declaration, permitted the circuit court to choose not to award
any attorney fees to Arrowhead Lake, despite prevailing on its claim.135
The majority opinion critiqued the dissenting opinion for ignoring the
clause “as deemed appropriate.”136 The physical modification of the
proposed orders with a line of “x”s demonstrated that the circuit court
judge was appraised of the issues and consciously chose not to award
attorney fees to the prevailing party.137 Under the rules of contract law
and reading the plain language of the Declaration, the court determined
that the circuit court had discretion in the amount of attorney fees it awards
to the prevailing party.138 Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not awarding any attorney fees to Arrowhead.139

B. Dissenting Opinion
Joined by Judge Powell, Chief Justice Wilson dissented from the
majority’s opinion.140 Focusing on “shall” and “as deemed appropriate,”
the dissent stated that section 18(d)(2) contained conflicting provisions
because it entitled the prevailing party to receive an award of attorney fees,
then removed that entitlement with the phrase “as deemed appropriate.”141
According to Chief Justice Wilson, the interpretation must give meaning
129

Id. at 168.
Id.
131
Id. (citing Entitle, WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002)).
132
See id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 169 n.7.
137
Id. at 170 (“The circuit court's decision-making process also is reflected by
its physical modification of the proposed judgment it adopted.”).
138
Id. at 168, 170.
139
Id. at 170.
140
Id. at 171 (Wilson, C.J., dissenting).
141
Id.
130
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to all the language used in section 18(d)(2) and resolve the apparent
contradiction,142 and the better view of the Declaration would have been
to apply the entitlement to an award of attorney fees, but not the amount.143
Chief Justice Wilson hinted that the majority’s opinion amounted to the
court’s determination of what was “fair” and not what the parties agreed
to in the declaration.144 By allowing the circuit court not to award attorney
fees to the prevailing party, the court had read the phrase “shall”
completely out of the declaration.145 The circuit court seemed to assume
that the attorney fees were worth $0.00.146 An award of zero dollars could
have theoretically been a reasonable conclusion. Still, the dissent reasoned
that this could not be an acceptable outcome because there was no factual
development at the circuit court level to suggest that an award of $0.00
was appropriate in this situation. 147 Such an award would have been
contrary to the evidence and therefore an abuse of discretion.148 The
dissent would have remanded the case back to the trial court to determine
the correct amount of attorney fees.149

V. COMMENT
The majority’s holding conflicts with the typical standard of review
in contract disputes,150 and its interpretation of the Declaration does not
seem logical when compared with similar out-of-state disputes.151
Additionally, the majority’s approach is unwise from a public policy
perspective because it threatens to substantially interfere with the
legitimate expectations of homeowners in CICs and the financial
governance of HOAs.

142

Id.
Id.
144
Id. at 171–72.
145
Id. at 171.
146
Id. at 171–72.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 172.
149
Id.
150
E.g., Ely v. Alter, 561 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
151
See infra notes 109–27.
143
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A. Fundamental Contract Interpretation Issues
Review for abuse of discretion and de novo review are different legal
standards on appeal.152 By characterizing this dispute as an improper
award of fees, counsel for both parties confined the issue on appeal to
whether the trial court abused its discretion instead of whether the trial
court correctly interpreted the contract.153 Whether the trial court had the
discretion in the first place to award attorney fees was a legal conclusion
determined through contract interpretation.154 The majority proves they
should have applied a de novo review by launching into contract
interpretation,155 but then states the court did not abuse its discretion by
not awarding attorney fees.156 If this dispute was really about an abuse of
discretion, there was no need to interpret the Declaration because, under
Missouri law, trial courts are free to set the amount of attorney fees.157 As
the Western District Court of Appeals for Missouri stated, the correct
standard for analyzing the Declaration was a de novo review.158 The
Declaration was a contract.159 Deciding the meaning of the attorney fees
clause requires a legal conclusion because the court applies contract
construction principles to the language in the declaration and determines
the resulting legal positions of the parties.160

152
Compare Ely, 561 S.W.3d at 11 (trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed
de novo), with WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d
383, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (appellate court will only overturn the trial court’s
decision if the trial court has abused its discretion).
153
Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief, Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d 165 (No.
SC98772), 2021 WL 1086431, at *1; Respondent’s Brief, Arrowhead Lake Ests.
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal (No. SC98772) 2021WL 1086434, at *9.
154
E.g., Ely, 561 S.W.3d at 11.
155
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d
165, 167 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
156
Id. at 170.
157
See WingHaven Residential Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383,
386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
158
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 2020 WL
5160693, at *2. (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2020) transferred to Mo. S.Ct. 624 S.W.3d 165
(Mo. 2021) (en banc). Compare Ely v. Alter, 561 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018)
(trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo), with WingHaven Residential
Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bridges, 457 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (appellate
court will only overturn the trial court’s decision if the trial court has abused its
discretion).
159
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 167.
160
Aggarwal, 2020 WL 5160693, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
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The contract in the instant case required an award of reasonable fees
“as deemed appropriate.”161 The dissenting opinion correctly points out a
harmonious reading of the Declaration that honors all words.162 A review
of similar declarations in other states supports the dissenting opinion’s
interpretation.163 When declarations featured “shall” and other language
implying some element of discretion, similar courts stated that the amount
was discretionary, and not the award itself.164 On de novo review, the
Supreme Court of Missouri should have interpreted this contract to mean
that the party prevailing in litigation receives its attorney fees in an amount
the trial court deems appropriate.165

B. Public Policy Implications of the Arrowhead Lake Decision
The unfortunate decision in the instant case may have far-reaching
consequences. HOAs preserve the value of the land within CICs through
their ability to protect homeowners’ expectations of how property is used
in a community setting.166 HOAs meet these expectations by levying
assessments against their lot owners.167 Unexpected, extraordinary
expenses such as protracted litigation may threaten the financial viability
of an HOA in two ways: current year budget shortfalls and inability to
finance and protect the covenant regime in the future.
The budgeting process is an important event each year because the
HOA board makes significant decisions that impact homeowners’ quality
of life.168 When discussing the needs of the community, the board
probably does not contemplate an expansive budget for attorney fees,
particularly when the declaration contains a provision entitling the HOA
to its attorney fees if it prevails in enforcing its CC&Rs.169 After all, the
Declaration governing Arrowhead Lake Estates contained such a

161

Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 168.
Id. at 171 (Wilson, C.J., dissenting).
163
See supra notes 109–27.
164
See supra notes 109–27.
165
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 171.
166
Franzese, supra note 2, at 695.
167
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 6.5(1) (2000).
168
Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, supra note 44, at 1149.
169
Many board members are novices in corporate governance and may not
appreciate the risk of litigation. See id. at 1144–48.
162
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provision.170 If the HOA incurs a large attorney fee bill and is denied
recovery for its attorney fees, there could be a sizable shortfall in the
budget. In the current year, the HOA may decide to collect trash less
frequently, mow common areas fewer times each month, plow the roads
less often if there is a severe winter, or curtail other services to cure the
deficit. The resulting lack of services may frustrate residents and create
future litigation due to the failure of the HOA to abide by the CC&Rs. 171
The HOA may face another challenge: enforcing and financing
CC&Rs throughout the CIC’s lifetime. In a context where the losing party
pays the HOA’s attorney fees, the offending homeowner makes the HOA
whole by reimbursing its expenses, allowing the HOA to continue
providing services and uniformly enforce the covenants as it is obligated
to do.172 It seems entirely inappropriate that a homeowner can purchase
property subject to publicly recorded restrictions, flout those restrictions,
and not be required to indemnify the HOA.173 Unfortunately, where the
HOA cannot recover its attorney fees, those costs must be distributed
across other homeowners.174 In light of the instant case, it appears that
such inequitable outcomes and distributions are more likely. Armed with
the majority opinion in the instant case, obstreperous homeowners may
feel emboldened to push the limits of what is allowed under the CC&Rs. 175
170

Supra note 35. This assumes that a straight-forward reading of the
Declaration requires an award of attorney fees as a matter of right, a position the which
weight of case law supports in contexts similar to Arrowhead Lake.
171
See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 359 (1998).
172
Pollack, supra note 3, at 847.
173
Arrowhead Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d
165, 167 (Mo. 2021) (en banc). In the instant case, the trial court decided that Dr.
Aggarwal and Dr. Garg did not have a legal right to construct the Out-building and
Arrowhead had a right to demand they cease construction of the structure. Id.; see also
Highfield Beach at Lake Michigan v. Sanderson, 954 N.W.2d 231, 252 (2020)
(attorney fees indemnify the HOA for enforcing the CC&Rs).
174
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 46, at 1135; Mountain View Condo. Ass'n v.
Bomersbach, 734 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (citing the trial court, which
stated: “The Association had the option of either backing off or enforcing it rights
under the Declaration and the decisional law. The fact that it elected not to
compromise, to stand on principal and to uphold the law requires that its attorney's
fees be covered. Any holding to the contrary would cause chaos in Condominium
Associations whose compliant members would have to bear the cost of dealing with
non-compliant members. [Appellant] had numerous opportunities to reevaluate her
position and put an end to the litigation. On December 12, 1991 the error of her
position should have been manifestly clear by virtue of the award of arbitrators in
favor of the [Association] and against her.”) (emphasis added).
175
See Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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In the face of such defiance, HOAs may shy away from enforcing the
CC&Rs to maintain a balanced budget.176 Without enforcement of the
rules, the expectations of homeowners regarding preservation of value or
character of neighborhood might not be met, mooting the purpose of a CIC
regime. This tension seems to create an impracticable puzzle for HOAs to
solve. HOAs may have inadequate reserves to bankroll the extensive
“trench warfare” required to force renegade owners into compliance with
the CC&Rs.177 Awarding attorney fees provided as a contractual matter
of right is a simple solution to buttress the benefit of the bargain
homeowners expect when joining a CIC, an outcome that could be reached
by judicial restraint or legislative action.

VI. CONCLUSION
The majority’s holding in Aggarwal takes a position diverging from
the weight of case authority.178 By failing to interpret the Declaration as a
mandate of attorney fees as a matter of right, the majority complicates
present and future CIC governance by denying HOA boards a
contractually guaranteed manner of recourse against recalcitrant
homeowners. Because declarations are somewhat standard legal
documents,179 it seems possible that other declarations in Missouri will
contain similarly worded attorney fee provisions. Amending a declaration
to include a more definite attorney fee provision may be impracticable in
many cases due to the rising number of renters in CICs. 180 Appealing an
adverse judgment can be an expensive and time-consuming process,181 so
another chance to reconsider this ruling may not arrive soon. Additionally,
the Supreme Court of Missouri may be wary of overturning itself so

176
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 798 S.E.2d 177, 185 (2017) (stating
“When the case is covered by a fee-shifting provision and the court weighs the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees to award, it cannot dismiss out of hand the costs
of litigation inflicted on the prevailing party by the losing party's insistence on its
losing argument, based solely on the dollar value of the claim. To do so deprives the
parties of the benefit of their bargain if the fee-shifting provision is contractual…”).
177
Arches Condo. Ass'n v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 122, 132 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015).
178
Aggarwal, 624 S.W.3d at 168–69 (holding 6 cases on point are
distinguishable from the case at bar).
179
See Hyatt, supra note 171, at 336.
180
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 46, at 1114.
181
Cf. Goins v. Goins, 406 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (party
struggled to fund defense of ex-husband’s appeal to reduce the amount of maintenance
he owed to his former wife).
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quickly and risking confusing attorneys.182 In the meantime, the holding
of this case is already appearing in Missouri practical guides.183 When this
issue does reappear, the court should seize that opportunity to overrule
Aggarwal and remedy the uncollectibility of attorney’s fees in Missouri.

182

Interview with the Honorable Paul C. Wilson, Chief Justice, Supreme Court
of Missouri (Feb. 15, 2022).
183
See § 1:9. Homeowners' Associations (HOA) Rights and Obligations to
repair; ability to collect attorney's fees, 36 Mo. Prac., Landlord-Tenant Handbook §
1:9.
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